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1 
Abstract 
 
This paper sets out to explain the highly uneven breakthrough of the “populist” or “contestatory” 
left during the “left turn” in Latin America since the late 1990s. Extant attempts to explain why 
moderate left parties that resemble the traditional social democratic mass parties have emerged in 
some countries, and populist left parties in others have been inconclusive. I argue that populist 
anti-establishment mobilization falls on fruitful ground where party systems do not adequately 
represent citizen preferences. This is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition for populist 
success. Combining data on party positions with mass-level surveys for two cases where new anti-
establishment parties that have been successful and two cases of failure, I analyze how well 
parties represent voters along the two most salient dimensions of political competition in Latin 
America: the economic antagonism between state and market, and the regime dimension that pits 
democrats (or those in favor of deepening democracy) against those holding positive evaluations 
of past military dictatorships. At the party level, I use data from the Salamanca Parliamentary 
Elites Surveys (PELA) and from the Brazilian Legislative Surveys. At the voter level, I rely on the 
World Values Survey (WVS) and the Latinobarómetro surveys. I first locate parties and voters on 
the dimensions mentioned above and then use an innovative measure to assess party system 
responsiveness. 
The paper shows that party systems in Venezuela and Bolivia lacked responsiveness prior to Hugo 
Chávez and Evo Morales’ successful bids for the presidency. In Chile, and to a lesser degree in 
Brazil, on the other hand, the close correspondence between voter preferences and party positions 
along the economic and political regime divides explains why new anti-establishment actors have 
not been successful. Looking at the evolution of party system responsiveness during the “left turn” 
questions the simple dichotomization of left parties into moderate and populist camps, however. 
While responsiveness improved substantially after the emergence of the Movement for Socialism 
(MAS) in Bolivia, it remains poor in Venezuela after Chávez came to power. Likewise, there are 
persistent differences in terms of representation in Chile and Brazil, both of which belong to the 
moderate left group.  
Beyond the initial expectations, the results thus show two pathways of the left to power in Latin 
America in the new millennium: A programmatic or “segmented” and a “majoritarian” path. 
Populist actors clearly pursue majoritarian strategies, but some non-populist actors do as well, as 
the Brazilian case shows.  
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Introduction 
 
The idea that failures of democratic representation create opportunities for political outsiders 
is central both to cleavage-based accounts of party system change, as well as to the ideational 
approach to populism. In the former framework, populists are seen as agents who re-establish 
congruence between party systems and specific segments of the electorate. The diagnosis of 
the ideational approach is one of a more generalized crisis of democratic representation that 
makes citizens susceptible to being mobilized by a (thin) ideology that pits “the people” 
against a corrupt and self-serving elite (c.f. Mudde, 2004; Hawkins, 2010; Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2013). In this paper, I show that the two approaches can fruitfully be combined 
when it comes to explaining the breakthrough of populist or radical challenger parties on the 
one hand, and the prevalence of moderate left parties on the other hand during Latin 
America’s “left turn” of the 1990s and 2000s.  
What the cleavage approach and the ideational populist approach share is the idea that 
representation failure is a necessary condition for the breakthrough of new political parties. 
This is the first hypothesis that is tested in this paper. The second proposition questions the 
stark differentiation between the radical/populist/ contestatory left in Venezuela, Bolivia, and 
Ecuador, and a pragmatic/moderate left in Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil that is prevalent in the 
early literature on the “left turn” or the “pink tide” (e.g., Castañeda, 2006; Weyland, 2009; 
2010, among others). I suggest instead that there is a programmatic and a populist path to 
power. The former can be studied using a cleavage approach based on the work on the older 
democracies of Western Europe, which focuses on the processes of dealignment and 
realignment between specific social groups and political parties. Along the populist path, on 
the other hand, new anti-establishment political actors have a majoritarian appeal because vast 
majorities of the voting population have become disillusioned with the existing parties. 
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Hence, although representation failure is a necessary condition for populist success, the size 
of the groups that are not adequately represented in a party system may differ in terms of 
numbers. 
Importantly, the distinction between a programmatic and a populist path to power cuts 
across the distinction between moderate and radical-populist left parties in Latin America. 
Thus, although the Movement towards Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia and the Bolivarian 
movement in Venezuela are commonly seen as exponents of the radical populist left – with a 
qualification made by Levitsky and Roberts (2011a) that is important, as we will see – the 
former followed the programmatic path, whereas the latter pursued what might be called a 
“pure” populist strategy. As a result, the MAS has restored responsiveness in the party 
system, whereas the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) in Venezuela has failed to do so. From 
the perspective adopted in this paper, MAS’ path to power has been similar to that pursued by 
the Brazilian Workers’ Party (PT), an exponent of the “moderate” left. However, the Brazilian 
case differs from the Bolivian one in that the electorate of the PT, by coming to encompass 
ever-larger segments of the population over time, has lost its unique ideological 
characteristics, thereby damaging the quality of representation.  
These hypotheses are tested based on an in-depth analysis of four Latin American cases: 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile. The Chilean case serves as an illustration of a country 
with moderate left-wing parties that were responsive to voter preferences throughout the 
period studied. In the other three cases, new political parties reached power during the “left 
turn”, yet these left parties differed profoundly in their appeals and in their impact on the 
party system. To assess party system responsiveness, I use an innovate approach that 
combines data on party positions with mass-level surveys along the state-market and 
democratic regime dimensions to measure the quality of representation. The analysis focuses 
on the mid-1990s, prior to the resurgence of the left that set off with Hugo Chávez’ successful 
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bid for the presidency in 1998. I then assess the quality of representation in the mid-2000s, 
after the left reached majorities throughout the countries studied.  
This paper is structured as follows. I begin by discussing the widespread distinction 
between the moderate and the populist left in Latin America, and then go on to present a 
theory of how established conflicts and alignments limit the space for new political actors in 
general, and populists in particular. I then develop the idea of a programmatic and a populist 
path to power, before justifying the choice of cases to be included in the analysis. The ensuing 
section explains in detail the data and methods I use to measure representational congruence. 
The empirical section then starts out by presenting aggregated evidence for the two 
hypotheses tested in this paper, but also takes a closer look at the positions of parties and their 
voters that drive these patterns.  
 
Populism and the “left turn” in Latin America 
 
In Latin America, the most recent wave of populism is associated with the “left turn” of the 
late 1990s and 2000s, following an era of structural economic adjustment policies and 
austerity (Panizza, 2009). While some of the left-wing parties that came to govern in the post-
neoliberal era resemble classical mass parties and have taken decades to institutionalize, 
others represent new political movements that appeal to voters by mobilizing against the 
political establishment. Weyland (2010) uses the term “contestatory” left to distinguish the 
latter group – encompassing Venezuela’s Bolivarian movement and Bolivia’s Movement for 
Socialism – from the more moderate leftist parties that governed Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil. 
While the latter respect economic constraints and political opposition, the contestatory left 
presents a more profound challenge to the status quo both in terms of rhetoric and action. As a 
working hypothesis, I label the contestatory variant of the left as “populist”, following the 
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recent comparative literature (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Roberts, 2015; Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2015). I discuss more fine-grained distinctions between new political actors on 
the left later on. As the empirical results presented in this paper show, these distinctions are 
highly relevant to the kind of electorate new left parties rally and to the impact they have on 
the representation of voter preferences.  
To distinguish between populist and non-populist forms of mobilization, I draw on the 
“ideational” approach to populism that conceives of the latter as a “thin ideology”, whose 
central element is the juxtaposition between “the people” and an elite that has betrayed the 
people and is no longer responsive to the preferences of the citizenry (e.g., Mudde, 2004; 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Hawkins et al., forthcoming). In this conception, 
populism is compatible with a range of distinct “host ideologies”, but in all its manifestations, 
it exhibits an anti-pluralist ideological core that consists in the idea that politics should be the 
expression of the “volonté générale” or the general will of the people (Canovan, 2002; 
Mudde, 2004, p. 543). While populism can also be viewed as merely being a discourse or a 
strategy used by political outsiders (e.g., Weyland, 2001), the definition offered by the 
ideational approach has the advantage of conceptual clarity (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 
2013, p. 499). Thus, it allows for a clear distinction between populist and non-populist forms 
of mobilization in theoretical terms, as well as for drawing the boundaries between populist 
worldviews and other manifestations of democratic malaise such as political alienation, lack 
of political trust, etc. (Hawkins et al., forthcoming; Hawkins, 2010).  
Thus far, there are rather few attempts to explain why moderate left-wing mass parties 
have emerged in some countries and populist left parties in others (e.g., Weyland, 2009). 
Remmer's (2012) analysis suggests that ideological demand-side factors are not particularly 
relevant in explaining the choice of moderate or populist/contestatory left-wing ideologies by 
parties in various countries. I counter this contention by tying voter preferences to differences 
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in the options that party systems offer to voters. Thus, my central hypothesis is that the lack of 
responsiveness of the party systems in the populist left countries explains why an anti-
political establishment mobilization was successful. A persistent lack of parties to respond to 
the preferences of voters erodes partisan loyalties and the legitimacy of the political system, 
making voters open for appeals by new political actors. This is why Hawkins (2010) and 
Doyle (2011) have identified political distrust as a crucial factor driving support for populists 
such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. The moderate left in Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil emerged 
in a much more incremental process typical of classical mass parties. The ability of these 
parties to successfully compete and build a following tempered discontent and voters 
remained committed to a strategy of political change within existing institutions. 
Consequently, due to the relatively high degree of citizen support in these countries, the 
moderate left relied and continues to rely on economic policy appeals and the salient regime 
issue to rally support, and does not adopt the anti-establishment rhetoric typical of the 
populist left. Thus, the distinction between the moderate and the populist left echoes that 
made by Levitsky and Roberts (2011b: 407–410) between the “institutional” and the “crisis-
outsider” path to power.  
 
Representation failure and the populist challenge 
 
Much of the literature has focused on proximate causes of the breakdown of parties or party 
systems, which often pave the wave for the rise of populist challengers (e.g., Lupu, 2014). 
Embedding these accounts in a more encompassing framework that includes proximate and 
more remote factors shows that short-term factors are often strongly shaped by long-term 
party system evolutions, and cannot be understood in isolation from them (c.f., Bornschier, 
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2016).1 Adopting such a perspective allows us to take advantage of a vast literature that has 
studied the conditions shaping the fortunes of challenger parties that are not populist (a 
similar point is made by Roberts 2015). My contention is that party systems under some 
certain conditions provide space for challengers – whether of a populist type or not – while 
the mobilization space for any kind of new actor is restricted under other conditions.  
From a historical cleavage perspective, the capacity of new political actors to rally voters is 
limited by voters’ existing partisan attachments (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 1999; 
Kriesi and Duyvendak, 1995; Bartolini, 2000; Bornschier, 2010). To the degree that existing 
divisions remain salient and that new divides do not reinforce, but rather cut across them, the 
party system tends to “organize” new issues “out of politics”, in Schattschneider's (1975 
[1960]: chap. 4) famous words.2 As long as an individual’s group attachments and political 
identities tied to the existing structure of conflict are stronger than his or her identification 
with a cause that draws a new group boundary – such as belonging to the amorphous group of 
“the pure people” that is betrayed by the corrupt elite – the individuals’ political alignment 
will remain stable. Any change in political preference thus requires a prior transformation in 
an individuals’ salience hierarchy of identities (Stryker, 1980, 2000). More specifically, older 
political identities must fade and new ones must become stronger to make a political 
realignment become a realistic possibility. I discuss these two components of the theoretical 
model – the fading of older political identities and the rise of new ones – in turn. 
(1) The strength of older divisions and the political identifications they entail at the 
individual level depends first of all on how strongly parties reinforce these identifications by 
                                                            
1  Another partial exception to the tendency to focus on short-term factors to explain the reconfiguration of 
Latin American party systems after the third wave of democratization is Kenneth Roberts’ (2014) work, 
given that his analysis stretches back to what he calls the “neo-liberal critical juncture” of 1980s. However, 
as I argue elsewhere (Bornschier 2016), the contrasting party systems evolutions during the neoliberal phase 
are themselves strongly shaped by earlier patterns of political representation.  
2  It is irrelevant in this respect whether extant alignments are strongly structured by social group membership 
– such as in the case of the traditional class and religious cleavages – or whether they are more strongly 
politically defined, as in the case of contemporary Western Europe’s over-arching economic and cultural 
ideological alignments (Bornschier 2010: 57-60). 
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offering distinctive positions along the older divides (Bornschier 2010: chap. 3). Conflict 
reinforces the group attachments that underlie political divides, and thus perpetuates 
alignments (Coser, 1956; Sartori, 1968). Political conflict nurtures the ideological schemas, in 
Conover and Feldman's (1984) terms, that voters have in their minds and that help them 
understand politics and form preferences concerning the political issues of the day. When 
different social groups each have strong partisan loyalties, the pattern of competition can be 
called “segmented” (Mair, 1997, pp. 162–171): The electoral market is tightly restrained and 
leaves little room for the emergence of new lines of opposition or new political parties. 
Indeed, there is now an impressive literature on party systems in the advanced democracies 
that underscores that conflict constitutes the reproductive mechanism underlying the 
traditional cleavages (van der Brug, 2010; Adams, de Vries and Leiter, 2011; Evans and 
Tilley, 2011; Evans and de Graaf, 2013; Rennwald and Evans, 2014). But there is also 
evidence from Latin America that polarization creates, while de-polarization dilutes the links 
between social groups and parties that stabilize party systems (e.g., Torcal and Mainwaring, 
2003; Bornschier, 2016; Levitsky et al., 2016). 
If parties converge in their spacial policy positions, this results in dealignment, or, in 
Roberts' (2014) terms, can set off a “dealigning critical juncture”. If voters’ ideological 
schemas are no longer nurtured by political conflict, voters become open for the appeals of 
new parties, movements, or charismatic leaders. Paradoxically, pacted transitions to 
democracy that are engineered to avoid extreme political conflict may have this long-term 
effect, as new generations of voters are socialized into politics that have no memory of the 
conflicts that made elite pacts necessary (Bornschier 2016). Examples in point are the pacted 
transition back to democracy in Colombia in 1958 after the civil war known as La Violencia, 
and the Punto Fijo pact agreed upon in Venezuela in 1958. In the first decades after the elite 
pacts that ended polarization, these party systems may have appeared “segmented” in the term 
discussed above, due to the memory of intense conflict. But these political identifications 
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became hollowed out as they were no longer nurtured by political conflict, but came to 
depend almost exclusively on the flow of clientelistic resources (e.g., Coppedge, 1994).3  
Indeed, when the established parties have converged in their policy positions, they are 
tempted to in some way or another inhibit the entry of competitors. Because they are no 
longer responsive to voters’ substantive policy preferences, they are left with two principal 
options: The first is to form an outright cartel by outlawing fringe parties or by introducing 
strong hurdles to the entry of new parties. The other option is to substitute programmatic 
partisan linkages with clientelistic efforts to maintain loyalties to the cartel.4 Clientelism, in 
turn, requires financial resources that foster corrupt practices. The dependence on a constant 
flow of particularistic resources also makes clientelistic party systems vulnerable to populist 
challenges as soon as these resources dry up. In fact, this short-term factor plays an important 
role in explaining the timing of the breakdown of party systems if parties do not complement 
particularistic linkages with programmatic ones. Evidence is provided here by the Venezuelan 
case (Roberts, 2003; Morgan, 2011), as well as the PRI’s loss of power in Mexico (Fox, 1994; 
Magaloni, 2006). In the medium term, cartelization thus fosters dealignment. In the longer 
run, it erodes the legitimacy of the political system, thereby opening a window of opportunity 
for populists, who are known to thrive on crises of legitimacy (Hawkins 2010, Doyle 2011).  
(2) On the other hand, change can also come from below, as a result of the evolving 
preferences of voters. These can result from structural change, as it has occurred in the 
advanced democracies, triggering the transformation of historical cleavages (Kitschelt, 1994; 
Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Kriesi et al., 2008). Likewise, the growth of the informal sector 
in Latin America has made the core constituencies along the state-market divide shrink. This 
creates new political potentials that parties can respond to in two different ways. First, an 
                                                            
3  Likewise, Karreth, Polk, and Allen (2012) show that European Social Democrats’ catch-all strategies may 
be electorally rewarding in the short run, but in the medium term, parties that abandon their traditional 
program often lose significant vote shares.  
4  This is actually the ideal-typical case of Katz and Mair's (1995) cartelization thesis, a phenomenon that in 
this pure form is a more adequate description of Latin American countries such as Venezuela and Colombia, 
rather than in the Western European context, for which the theory was originally developed. 
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established or a new party can address the substantive concerns that underlie the political 
potentials, for example by adopting social policy initiatives that provide universalistic social 
rights for those in need (e.g., Pribble, 2013). Alternatively, parties may adapt their linkage 
portfolio by distributing clientelistic resources to dealigned constituencies (Levitsky, 2003; 
Luna, 2014). Clientelism may for some time compensate for a lack of party system 
responsiveness and therefore obscure the fact that voters are dealigned. However, if parties 
replace programmatic linkages by clientelistic ones, this may render them more vulnerable to 
attacks by anti-establishment actors in times of crisis (Morgan, 2011). Even then, the response 
need not be populist: A crisis of representation may be resolved by non-populist forces or 
former fringe parties that mobilize the electoral potentials neglected by established parties, 
but only if they stay true to their campaign promises. By performing policy shifts (Stokes, 
2001) or setting off dealigning critical junctures (Roberts 2014), new political parties may 
worsen the crisis of legitimacy that the political system faces. 
 
Programmatic and populist paths to power 
 
To summarize, an erosion of a party system’s roots in society – and the concomitant large 
number of floating voters that results from the process of dealignment – represents a 
necessary condition for populist success. So far, the cleavage approach and the ideational 
approach to populism concur. They differ, however, in the diagnosis of how deep the crisis of 
representation runs. From a cleavage perspective, populism is a phenomenon that 
accompanies gradual processes of realignment in mature party systems, triggered by slowly 
evolving voter preferences. In other words, it tends to assume that populism is driven by 
change from below, rather than cartelization or dealigning critical junctures set off by parties 
themselves, building on the distinction made in the preceding section. Change from below in 
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a system where parties are responsive to voter preferences translates into a programmatic path 
to power, where the left adopts clear-cut policy positions and mobilizes voters who closely 
mirror these ideological convictions. As a result, by representing political preferences that 
were hitherto neglected, the left establishes responsiveness in the party system.  
According to the earlier literature that adopted a dichotomous distinction between two 
types of left-wing parties during the “left turn” (e.g., Castañeda 2006, Weyland 2009, 2010), 
the moderate left followed this pathway, but as we will see, the Bolivian MAS did so as well. 
If left-wing challengers adopt a populist rhetoric, it remains a “thin ideology” that is 
subordinate to a powerful host ideology. This predominance of populism’s host ideology 
translates into what may be called “segmented populism” (Bornschier forthcoming): Despite 
claiming to represent “the people”, populists rally groups of voters whose substantive policy 
preferences are relatively homogeneous and closely mirrored by the populist challengers 
themselves. As a consequence, like non-populist parties that follow the programmatic path to 
power, segmented populists can be expected to improve the representation of voters’ 
substantive policy preferences. Thus, the segmented populist path may share important 
similarities with Levitsky and Roberts' (2011b: 407–410) “institutional path to power”. 
The situation is different where the party system has been unresponsive to voter 
preferences for longer periods of time: More in line with the ideational approach to populism 
than with cleavage theory, the ideological convergence of the main parties has resulted in a 
more deep-rooted democratic malaise. If parties fail to respond to voter preferences, large 
parts of the electorate first lose trust in the existing parties, and then in the political system 
more generally (e.g., Hawkins 2010, Doyle 2011). If political support erodes, populist 
messages are more likely to rally electoral majorities. In the populist pathway to power, a left-
wing political outsider mobilizes adopts a Manichean discourse drawing an antagonism 
between the established political class or “political caste” on the one hand, and “the people” 
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on the other. By promising to represent the interests of the people, rather than more narrow 
interests (or individual self-interest), populists succeed in mobilizing broad swaths of the 
electorate.  
Because of this “majoritarian” character of populism that thrives on diverse groups of 
dealigned voters, this path to power is unlikely to improve representation. In other words, I 
expect similarly low levels of party system responsiveness to voter preferences before and 
after populists have gained majorities in these contexts. As we will see, although Hugo 
Chávez and his party exhibited quite clear-cut economic policy positions, this did not 
translate into them mobilizing voters with similarly clear preferences (see also Hawkins 2010 
for similar results in an analysis of the election that brought Hugo Chávez to power in 1998).  
 
Case selection 
 
The analysis that follows focuses on four countries that are generally considered to stand for 
the “left turn” in Latin American politics since the late 1990s. I start out by selecting two 
countries where a near-consensus exists that their most important left-wing parties belong to 
the moderate left group, namely, the Socialist Party (PSCh) and Party for Democracy (PPD) 
in Chile and the Workers’ Party (PT) in Brazil. Whereas the Chilean left has roots going back 
to the 1920s, the PT was only founded in 1980, during Brazil’s transition to democracy 
(Keck, 1992). Bolivia and Venezuela, on the other hand, have left-wing parties that many 
observers classify as belonging to the radical, contestatory, or populist left (e.g., Weyland, 
2009, 2010). However, Levitsky and Roberts (2011a) draw an important distinction between 
the populist left and the “movement left” (based on differences in the concentration or 
dispersion of authority within parties). Along this dimension, the Venezuelan MVR exhibits 
concentrated authority, while the Bolivian MAS is considered a case of dispersed authority 
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due to its roots in social movements. Likewise, along Panizza’s (2009: 193) differentiation 
between party, social, and personalist forms of representation, Bolivia scores high on both 
social and personalist representation, indicating a difference to Venezuela, where the 
personalist element prevails. Thus, while the literature unanimously classifies Hugo Chávez 
as populist according to the definition used in this paper (e.g., Hawkins, 2010; Levitsky and 
Loxton, 2013), the verdict is more open on Evo Morales. For Madrid (2008), Morales is an 
“ethnopopulist”, whereas others more adequately and use the term “movement left” for the 
MAS (Levisky and Roberts, 2011a) and the label “movement populist” for Morales (Levitsky 
and Loxton, 2013).  
Adopting Levitsky and Roberts’ (2011a) typology, but adapting their classification of the 
Brazilian PT to account for the difference in age between the Brazilian and the Chilean left – 
even the PPD, as a spin-off from the PSCh, has a longer history than the PT –, the cases can 
be grouped as depicted in Figure 1. The distinction between concentrated and dispersed 
authority tends to go together with that between programmatic and non-programmatic modes 
of mobilization (c.f. Kitschelt, 2000). Hence, the Peronists in Argentina would be situated in 
the established party organization/concentrated authority cell, but are left out in the present 
analysis. It is generally assumed that the concentrated authority typical of populist movements 
or parties forges a “charismatic bond” between parties and their followers (Madsen and Snow, 
1991; Hawkins, 2010) that is less strongly based in the representation of voters’ substantive 
policy preferences than in the case of mass-organic or electoral-professional left parties (c.f. 
Levitsky and Roberts, 2011a: 11-16).  
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Figure 1: Typology of left parties and location of cases studied (adapted from Levitsky and 
Roberts 2011a: 13) 
 Established party organization New political movement 
Dispersed authority/ 
programmatic 
PSCh (Chile) PT (Brazil) 
MAS (Bolivia) 
Concentrated authority/ 
clientelistic and/or charismatic 
 MVR (Venezuela) 
 
Within each of the four countries, I analyze at least one time point before the challenge by 
the left. In most countries, this coincides with the first round of data available from the 
University of Salamanca Surveys of Latin American Legislators (PELA) in the mid-1990s. 
Offering the first comprehensive measurement of party positions across Latin America, this is 
the first point in time that allows for an analysis of party system responsiveness. Table 1 lists 
the crucial phase prior to the left becoming a serious contender in elections, as well as the 
type of left-wing challenge (moderate left, populist left, or movement left) of the parties 
involved. In Chile, the left was of course already entrenched in the 1990s. In Brazil, Lula 
came close to winning the presidency in 1989 against Collor, but he was far less successful in 
1994 and 1998, and it is only after a profound transformation of the party that it became a 
contender for power again in 2002 (Hunter, 2010). Ideally, the analysis for Brazil would 
therefore go back beyond the 1994 elections, where my data starts, but as we will see, the 
evolution between 1997 and 2002 is already highly instructive. 
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Table 1: Cases, party system divides, and types of left-wing challengers 
Country 
Crucial period prior 
to left challenge Time points used in analysis 
Proximate 
election 
Type of left-
wing challenge Parties 
Chile  – 1994 (PELA) - 1995 (WVS) 1993  Moderate left PSCh, PPD 
  2006 (PELA) - 2005 (WVS) 2005   
Brazil 1980s/1990s 1997 (BLS) - 1995 (LB) 1994 Moderate left PT 
  2005 (PELA) - 2002 (ESEB) 2002   
Venezuela Before 1998 1995 (PELA) - 1996 (WVS) 1993 Populist left PSUV/MVR 
  2000 (PELA) - 2000 (WVS) 1998    
Bolivia Before 2002 1998 (PELA) - 1998 (LB) 1997  Movement left MAS 
  2003 (PELA) - 2004 (LB) 2002   
  2006 (PELA) - 2005 (LB) 2006   
Key to data sources: PELA: Surveys of Latin American Legislators (http://americo.usal.es/oir/elites/ index.htm); 
BLS: Brazilian Legislative Survey (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml? persistentId=hdl:1902.1/14970); 
WVS: World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org); LB: Latinobarómetro (www.latinobarometro.org); 
ESEB: Estudio Eleitoral Brasileiro, CESOP/FGV/ BRASIL02.DEZ-01838 (available at: 
www.cesop.unicamp.br). 
 
The left challenge is more recent in Bolivia and Venezuela, on the one hand. In Venezuela, 
candidates from the established parties still dominated the 1993 elections. Hugo Chávez 
immediately won when he ran for president in 1998, having founded the Movement for the 
Fifth Republic party (MVR) a year before. In Bolivia, Evo Morales finished second in the 
2002 elections, only slightly behind the victorious Sánchez de Lozada, and the MAS can be 
considered a serious challenger from then on. The analysis of the Bolivian case therefore 
starts in 1998.5 I then select one point in time after the left won the presidency to assess 
whether the breakthrough of the left has improved representation or not. In Venezuela, it 
would have been interesting to track party system responsiveness beyond 2000, but 
unfortunately, this is impossible due to the lack of adequate data. 
Generally, the face-to-face interviews with legislators that the PELA data is based on were 
conducted at the beginning of each legislative period (Alcántara Sáez, 2008). Thus, they allow 
for an assessment of the relationship between party positions and voter preferences shortly 
after elections in which parties received a mandate from voters. Because the earliest PELA 
                                                            
5  There are more time points available for Bolivia because PELA surveys were conducted after early elections 
as well.  
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survey available for Brazil is from 2005, I use the Brazilian Legislative Survey (Power and 
Zucco, 2011) to measure party positions in 1997. I have then matched the elite data with 
survey data from proximate time points.6 Wherever possible, I have relied on data from the 
World Values Survey (WVS), since it offers the most representative samples, as well as a 
wide range of items to operationalize the economic and regime dimensions. For Bolivia and 
Brazil, which are not included in the WVS, I rely on the Latinobarómetro surveys, as well as 
the Brazilian Election Survey for 2002. The Latinobarómetro data has the clear disadvantage 
of offering representative samples only for the urban population before 2000/2001, and this 
will have to be kept in mind for the interpretation of the results for Bolivia and Brazil.  
I measure party system responsiveness along those dimensions of conflict that have been 
identified as the most salient ones in the literature. Analyses by Moreno (1999) Rosas (2010), 
and Bornschier (2013) converge in identifying the economic state-market divide as the single 
most important ideological division. In several countries, these authors also find the regime 
dimension centering on evaluations of past military dictatorships and democratic regime 
preferences to cleave parties. Due to the occurrence of military dictatorships in the 1970s and 
1980s in Chile, Brazil, and Bolivia, regime dimensions are potentially relevant in these 
countries. In Venezuela, on the other hand, I explore whether a regime divide is present after 
Hugo Chávez launched the Boliviarian Republic. The next section spells out how these 
dimensions are operationalized and how responsiveness is measured.  
 
Measuring party system responsiveness: conceptual issues 
 
The responsiveness of governments to the preferences of citizens is a defining attribute of 
polyarchy, according to Dahl (1971, 1989), or of the liberal concept of representation (Pitkin, 
                                                            
6  The match is not perfect, but given the concept of representation that I use, this is not a problem, as I lay out 
in the next section. 
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1967). One of the central junctures in the “chain of responsiveness” (Powell, 2004) that runs 
from public preferences to public policies, is the congruence between voter preferences and 
party positions. According to the “responsible party model”, first theorized by the  APSA 
Committee on Political Parties (APSA, 1950), and synthesized by Thomassen (1994, pp. 251–
2), congruence is achieved if, first, parties offer diverging programmatic offerings, and 
second, voters chose parties according to these offerings. Consequently, the quality of 
representation has frequently been assessed by looking at the correspondence between the 
political preferences of voters and their representatives (Dalton, 1985; Powell, 2000; Luna 
and Zechmeister, 2005, 2010; see also Diamond and Morlino, 2005 for a theoretical account). 
This is the strategy I use here, with the qualifier that the data at hand does not allow for a 
measure of the absolute congruence between the positions of legislators and voters, but only 
for their relative correspondence. I come back to this issue below. 
As explained in the preceding section, the elite data was collected relatively shortly after 
elections, warranting the assumption that legislators expressed positions in tune with their 
campaign promises. Voter preferences were measured at temporally close time points, i.e. 
either in the same year or, if no suitable data is available, in the year before or after.7 If 
legislators have clear ideological profiles and voters’ preferences are relatively stable, the 
match is thus satisfactory. Where party systems are fluid and voter preferences are fickle, on 
the other hand, it is heroic from the start to assume strong representation. 
I operationalize the state-market and regime dimensions at the party and voter levels by 
drawing on all available issue-specific items available in the elite and mass surveys. [The 
items used will be listed in an Appendix in a future version of this paper.] The choice of the 
adequate strategy to aggregate these issues into overarching dimensions is not straightforward 
                                                            
7  In Brazil, the correspondence is not ideal. For the 1994-1998 legislature I have opted for the 1995 
Latinobarómetro dataset (the earliest available) because of its temporal proximity to the elections in 1994, 
given that party preferences are relatively unstable in Brazil (e.g., Mainwaring 1999). For the 2002 election, 
I use the Brazilian Election Survey conducted shortly after that election, while PELA only interviewed MPs 
in 2005.  
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in most Latin American countries, however. In political contexts where politicians and voters 
have coherent ideological schemas that guide them through politics, for example in Western 
Europe, or in Latin American countries with sophisticated voters such as those in Chile and 
Uruguay, latent ideological dimensions can easily be formed using factor analysis (Kriesi et 
al., 2008; Bornschier, 2013). In countries such as Venezuela, however, responses to various 
items that on theoretical grounds we would assume to measure the same underlying 
dimension, often turn out to be not al all correlated in practice. This may be due to the fact 
that only some of the issues that surveys tap are politicized and therefore relevant in a given 
country. Absent the ideological schemas prevalent in the advanced democracies, respondents 
do not give consistent answers to these questions. Including issues that respondents are less 
sure about blurs the positions of parties and voters. As a consequence, we might 
underestimate the level of party system responsiveness with respect to salient issues.  
I avoid this problem by using discriminant analysis to operationalize latent dimensions, 
both at the level of legislators, as well as at the voter level. This technique uncovers 
dimensions that are politically meaningful because they help to distinguish respondents 
according to their party membership or preference. In other words, the analysis makes the 
operationalization of policy dimensions center on those political issues that set politicians and 
voters from different parties apart. This is thus an approach that is benevolent in terms of 
judging the responsiveness of a party system, similar to Luna and Zechmeister’s (2005) “best 
score” practice, where only those items for each category are taken into account that exhibit 
the highest match between parties and voters. The conceptual downside of this approach is 
that the measurement of latent dimensions becomes confounded from the start with party 
politics. Thus, it tends to overestimate the quality of representation, but it has the advantage 
of providing a tough test for the hypothesis that it is representation failure that provides space 
for populists.  
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The following issues are used from the elite and mass surveys to construct the economic 
state-market and regime issues:  
 
Economic issues 
- Welfare: Expansion of or defense of a generous welfare state, support for public 
education, redistribution, and equality. 
- Economic liberalism: Opposition to market regulation, and protectionism, support for 
deregulation, for more competition, and privatization. 
 
Regime dimension 
- Regime: Assessment of past military regime (if there was a military dictatorship), support 
for democracy, opposition against authoritarianism. 
- Army: Support for a strong national defense, against reducing the military’s budget (to 
some extent, this can be interpreted as a regime dimension). 
 
In empirical terms, in countries with a history of military intervention, the regime dimension 
often meshes assessments of the army with orientations towards democracy, as earlier 
analyses of the dimensionality of political space reveal (Bornschier, 2013). The current 
analysis confirms this (these detailed results will be made available in an Appendix in the 
next version of this paper). The reason it makes sense to include items tapping evaluations of 
the role of the armed forces is that respondents in many countries are reluctant to express 
skepticism towards democracy, but are willing to say that they favor a strong role of the 
military or assess past military interventions positively. In order to allow for these country 
differences in the make-up of the regime dimension, I include both of the above categories in 
the same discriminant analysis. 
To deal with missing values, I first run a discriminant analysis with all items that can be 
classified as belonging to the above categories. I then impute missing values based on linear 
imputation using all items in a category that were associated with the dimension in question in 
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the theoretically expected direction. I then re-run the discriminant analysis using only these 
variables, with imputed values. This procedure assures a clear interpretation of the resulting 
dimension and avoids imputing missing values based on variables where we do not know 
what they actually measure.  
The most important step in the analysis is to assess the correspondence between the 
positions of parties and those of their voters. Because the positions of parties and voters are 
not measured on the same scales, this correspondence can be judged only in relative terms. 
Because I cannot measure the absolute correspondence between party positions and voter 
preferences that is implied in the term congruence, I follow Wlezien (2016), in labeling my 
measure as one that assesses the responsiveness of the party system to voter preferences (even 
if no over-time adaptation of policy in response to public opinion is implied). I assess how 
responsive parties are to voter preferences by regressing the position of the party the 
respondent voted for on his/her individual preference along a given dimension.8 Put 
differently, I use the ability of voter preferences to explain the ideological position of their 
preferred party as a measure of congruence. The most important information provided by this 
analysis is not the coefficient (which again is not independent of the differing scales on which 
parties and voters are placed), but whether individual preferences are a significant predictor of 
party choice. Consequently, I use the z-statistic of the ordered logit regression as a measure 
for the congruence of representation. Because the z-value is determined also by sample size, 
and the latter varies by country and year, I weight the z-value by the number of respondents 
on which the logistic regression is based. This results in a measure that can be compared 
across countries and time. 
 
                                                            
8  Technically, I attribute to each individual the policy position of his/her party, and then assess how well 
individual preferences explain the position of the party they voted for. Since the variance of the dependent 
variable is limited by the low number of parties competing, I use ordered logit instead of OLS regression. 
The approach is set out in more detail in Bornschier (2013). 
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Results: Potentials for left-wing (populist) mobilization in Latin America 
 
In presenting the results of the analysis of responsiveness, I complement these with a measure 
of the degree of polarization a divide entails at the party system level. Polarization is a key 
dimension to characterize the nature of competition between parties (Dalton, 2008), in part 
because is an indication of the salience of competitive dimensions and because it impinges on 
how strongly partisan camps differ in terms of ideological outlook or whether parties target 
similar groups of voters (Bornschier, 2010: Chap. 3). To measure polarization, I calculate the 
standard deviation of parties’ mean positions, weighted by party size.9 I then illustrate these 
aggregated results with a few selected figures showing the positions of parties and voters on 
which the aggregated results are based. 
 
Responsiveness in the mid-1990s: The populist breeding ground 
Figure 2 characterizes representation along the economic dimension in the four countries 
studied by situating elections along the dimensions of responsiveness and polarization. The 
vertical line in the plot roughly indicates the cut-off point between statistically significant and 
non-significant measures of responsiveness.10 It is more difficult to define in absolute terms 
when polarization is high and when it is low, and I have drawn a line that approximately 
halves the distribution. The results are particularly interesting because they conform to 
theoretical expectations, yet nuance them in various ways. I begin by discussing differences 
between my cases in the mid-1990s, and then go on to study divergent country trajectories 
over time. 
 
                                                            
9  Party strength is derived in seat shares from the PELA elite surveys. 
10 This differentiation is based on the original z-values, not those transformed to account for differences in 
sample size that make up the horizontal dimension in the figure. 
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Figure 2: Party system responsiveness and polarization along the state-market dimension 
over time 
 
In both cases that saw the breakthrough of new political actors, responsiveness was low in 
the 1990s: The Venezuelan and Bolivian elections of 1995 and 1998, respectively, show a 
party system that is totally unrepresentative of voter preferences.11 Party positions are less 
polarized than for example in Chile in 1995. The responsiveness measure is zero, indicating 
that party positions along the state-market dimension are not related to voter preferences. 12 
                                                            
11 Recall that the sample is not nationally representative in Bolivia, implying that urban voters are over-
represented. Given that this electoral segment is more likely to be politically informed and cast a 
programmatic vote, the result that the party system is unresponsive in 1998 is all the more significant.  
12 In fact, the raw z-values are negative, indicating not only that there is no relationship between voter 
preferences and party positions, but that the relationship is negative. In other words, more left-wing voters 
actually voted for more right-wing parties and vice-versa. I have defined the minimum of the responsiveness 
measure at zero because it is questionable whether representation quality can be negative. This does not 
change the substantive interpretation of the results, however.  
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Clearly, partisan alignments must be due to something else than voters’ differing economic 
policy preferences. Figure 3 shows the positions of parties and voters on which this 
assessment is based for Venezuela. While the positions of parties more or less conform to 
expectations, Acción Democrática (AD) occupying a centrist position and the Comité de 
Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI) issuing more market-liberal stances, 
Causa R and Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) take strongly left-wing positions. 
Convergencia National (CONV), a spin-off from the long-established COPEI, is situated in 
between the traditional parties. These party positions are not a mirror of their voters’ policy 
preferences, however. Most electorates are hardly distinguishable, and occupy rather centrist 
positions, with extensive ideological overlap – the bars below the mean positions show the 
standard deviation and thus the homogeneity or heterogeneity of party electorates.13 In fact, 
parties even misrepresent their voters’ preferences: This is most clearly the case for COPEI 
supporters, as well as for those expressing a preference for MAS, which likewise 
misrepresents its voters (they actually appear most right-wing). Overall, the unresponsive 
party system clearly provided a favorable breeding ground for Hugo Chávez’ populist appeal.  
 
 
Figure 3: Parties (above) and voters (below) on the state-market divide in Venezuela,  
mid-1990s 
Legend: CAUSA R, La Causa Radical; MAS, Movimiento al Socialismo; CONV, Convergencia National; AD, 
Acción Democrática; COPEI, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente. 
 
                                                            
13 When looking at these figures, keep in mind that individual respondents’ positions are standardized: 
Consequently, the zero point in the center of the graphs is not a neutral position, but simply halves the 
distribution of legislators’ and voters’ positions. 
AD COPEIMAS CAUSA R CONV
ADCOPEI MAS
CAUSA RCONV
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Turning to the cases with superior levels of representation in Figure 2, the Brazilian party 
system stands out for being relatively representative of voter preferences in 1997. It must be 
underlined, however, that this result is based on a survey that is representative only of 33% of 
the population, and is thus a more adequate depiction of the urban population than the 
population at large.14 In contrast to Brazil, Chile does not exhibit particularly strong 
responsiveness in terms of the economic state-market dimension in 1995, as put in evidence 
in Figure 2. At first sight, this is somewhat surprising, at least if we recall that Chile was 
among the two countries with the highest levels of congruence in Luna and Zechmeister’s 
(2005) analysis and also scored high both in terms of party system institutionalization 
(Mainwaring and Scully, 1995), and in the clarity of the programmatic alternatives offered by 
the party system (Kitschelt et al., 2010). As we can see in Figure 4, parties and electorates do 
line up in the same order, but the relationship between positions at the two levels is significant 
only at the 10%-level. In fact, although the party system is highly polarized along the 
economic dimension, electorates are situated rather close to each other. Moreover, Partido por 
la Democracia (PPD) voters do not more strongly favor state intervention in the economy 
than those supportive of the conservative Renovatión National (RN). PPD as a party, 
however, is hardly distinguishable from the left-leaning Socialists (PS) and the Christian 
Democrats (PDC).  
 
 
Figure 4: Parties (above) and voters (below) on the state-market divide in Chile, mid-1990s 
Legend: PPD, Partido Por la Democracia; PS, Socialist Party; DC, Christian Democrat Party; RN, Renovatión 
Nacional; UDI, Unión Demócrata Independiente. 
                                                            
14 See documentation at http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp. 
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This does not imply that Chile provided fertile ground for populists, however: Looking at 
the upper-left panel in Figure 5 reveals that the state-market divide is overshadowed by an 
overpowering regime divide. In terms of the regime divide, the Chilean party system is the 
most  polarized of  all included  in this  analysis at  any point in  time,  and  it  reaches  by  far  
 
Figure 5: Party system responsiveness and polarization along the state-market and the  
regime dimensions, over time 
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highest level of responsiveness of any competitive dimension in the mid-1990s. It is thus 
important to take into account the two-dimensional structure of political competition: As 
Figure 5 shows, the regime divide was far more salient in terms of structuring partisan 
alignments than the economic dimension at this point in time. These results are in line with 
those presented by Torcal and Mainwaring (2003).  
Overall, the hypothesis that representation failure represents a prerequisite both for the 
breakthrough of new political actors in general, as well as populist challengers in particular, is 
clearly confirmed by the comparison of the four cases. I now turn to the question what 
happens after the left becomes a serious contender for power, allowing for a distinction 
between the populist and the programmatic path to power during the “left turn”. 
 
Diverging patterns of representation between Venezuela and Bolivia in the “left turn”  
Figure 2 shows a stark divergence in the evolution of responsiveness over time along the 
economic dimension in the four countries. The contrast between the Venezuelan and the 
Bolivian case is particularly interesting. The quality of representation surges in Bolivia with 
the appearance of MAS shortly before the 2002 elections, indicating that the new party served 
as a rallying point for left-leaning voters who lacked a credible political alternative before. 
The appearance of the populist left in Venezuela, in contrast, does nothing to improve 
responsiveness. The emergence of these two exponents of the “contestatory left” has thus had 
a profoundly different impact on representation. We can understand why by comparing the 
positions of parties and voters in these two countries. As we see in Figure 6 for Venezuela in 
2000, the MVR constitutes a clear left-wing pole in the party system: The MVR forms a 
coherent state interventionist force in parliament, uniting parliamentarians with decidedly 
state interventionist positions, which stand in stark contrast to the more market liberal 
convictions of AD and COPEI. The supporters of the Bolivarian movement on average do not 
27 
exhibit a similarly left-wing profile, however. Rather, they are situated in the center of the 
distribution of voter preferences, underlining both the heterogeneity of the populist electorate, 
as well as the non-programmatic nature of its mobilization. Consequently, the emergence of 
the populist left, while clearly expanding the range of policy options that voters can chose 
from, did little to improve substantive policy representation. The other parties in the 
Venezuelan party system even misrepresent their voters: AD and COPEI voters are those that 
profess most strongly state interventionist views, while these parties themselves have 
converged on a market liberal profile. Those supporting Projecto Venezuelano (PV) and 
Primero Justicia (PJ) are most market liberal, on the other hand. 
 
 
Figure 6: Parties (above) and voters (below) on the state-market divide in Venezuela, 2000 
Legend: MVR, Movimiento V República (Bolivarian Movement); MAS, Movimiento al Socialismo; AD, 
Acción Democrática; COPEI, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente; PV: Proyecto 
Venezuelano (Henrique Sallas Romer); PJ: Primero Justicia (Henrique Capriles). 
 
By contrast, MAS in Bolivia rallies an electorate that stands out much more clearly for its 
state-interventionist political ideology (Figure 7). Most of the other parties also represent their 
voters relatively well, with some exceptions such as Unidad Cívica Solidaridad (UCS), which 
became a negligible political force, however, after betraying its voters by joining the 
“Megacoalition” that supported the presidency of former military dictator Hugo Banzer from 
1997 to 2001. Apart from Banzer’s own Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN) party, this 
coalition also included the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR). This implied what might be 
considered a second “de-aligning critical juncture”, after the long established and once truly 
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Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) had campaigned on a left-wing platform in the 
mid-1980s, only to then implemented neoliberal reforms (c.f., Roberts, 2014: chap. 6). While 
all of this resulted in the party system being unresponsive to voter preferences in 1998 (as we 
saw in Figure 2), Figure 7 shows that responsiveness was restored as a consequence of the 
MAS emerging and becoming a rallying point for leftist voters. The results for the 2006 
elections are similar, and not shown here.  
 
 
Figure 7: Parties (above) and voters (below) on the state-market divide in Bolivia, 2003-4 
Legend: MAS, Movimiento al Socialismo; UCS, Unidad Cívica Solidaridad; NFR, Nueva Fuerza Republicana; 
MIR, Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionaria; MNR, Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario; ADN, Acción 
Democrática Nacionalista. 
 
While there is a strong contrast in terms of responsiveness along the economic state-market 
dimension in Bolivia and Venezuela, returning to Figure 5 testifies to the existence of one 
programmatic linkage in Venezuela: That centering on the democratic regime issue. 
Divergent assessments of the role of the armed forces and of the stability of democracy in the 
country polarize both parliamentarians and voters far more than economic policy options. On 
the one side, there are those professing trust in the armed forces and supporting the Bolivarian 
project, and on the other parties and their voters alike are concerned over the role of the armed 
forces and of the state of democracy (detailed information on how these dimensions were 
operationalized will be provided in a future version of the paper). Put together, the results 
regarding the economic and regime dimensions in Venezuela in 2000 indicate that the parties 
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opposing the Bolivarian movement rally their voters primarily based on their defense of 
democracy, rather than their opposition against the regime’s economic policies. 
 
The moderate left and party system responsiveness: A paradox 
The second striking finding in terms of the effect of the “left turn” on representation is that 
programmatic responsiveness has decreased considerably in Brazil between 1997 and 2002, 
as the evolution in Figure 2 shows. More specifically, the ideological distinctiveness of the 
PT’s support coalition in terms of economic policy preferences has become strongly diluted in 
the process of the PT becoming a majoritarian political force. Figures 8 and 9 show the 
positions of parties and voters in 1997 and 2002, respectively. At the party level, not very 
much changes between these two elections: The PT occupies a staunchly state interventionist 
position, while the Liberal Front (PFL, now Democrats) adopts the most market liberal 
stance, with PMDB and PSDB situated in between (the latter two switching their respective 
locations). In 1997, these positions mirror the relative preferences of party electorates: 
Although electorates are situated relatively close to each other, they line up in the order 
mirroring the positions of the parties. More so than the parties themselves, their voters exhibit 
considerable overlap, but at least directional policy voting is pretty apparent in Figure 8: 
Voters seem to know what parties stand for and support parties that mirror their preferences in 
more radical terms.  
By 2002, however, the PT’s support coalition has become more similar in terms of 
heterogeneity to that of the MVR in Venezuela than that mobilized by the movement left in 
Bolivia, or the moderate left in Chile (see below). The average PT voter is not ideologically 
distinct along the state-market dimension, but rather situated in the center of the preference 
distribution. Surprisingly, both PFL and PMDB voters are more state interventionist than PT 
voters, at least in terms of their preferences regarding market regulation on which the 
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measurement is based (note that there are no items in the election survey that tap support for 
social programs such as “Bolsa Familia”, a point I return to later on). In parallel, the regime 
divide that was pretty strong in Brazil in 1997 fades as well, as Figure 5 shows. However, 
differing conceptions of democracy and attitudes regarding clientelism and corruption still 
cleave the electorate, and PT voters remain more critical of clientelism and corruption than 
other voters (results not shown).15 Nonetheless, some of this distinctiveness has withered as 
well in the course of the PT winning the presidency.  
 
 
Figure 8: Parties (above) and voters (below) on the state-market divide in Brazil,  
mid-1990s 
Legend: PT, Partido dos Trabalhadores; PSDB, Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira; PMDB, Partido do 
Movimento Democrático Brasileiro; PFL, Partido da Frente Liberal (now Democratas); PPB, Partido 
Progressista Brasileira. 
 
 
Figure 9: Parties (above) and voters (below) on the state-market divide in Brazil,  
early-mid 2000s 
Legend: PL, Partido Liberal; PP, Partido Progressista (formerly PPB). For all other parties, see Figure 8. 
                                                            
15 I have used these items to measure the regime divide at the voter level because they are available in the 
Brazilian election study that I use, in contrast to the data sources used in the other countries. This 
operationalization seems particularly pertinent in the Brazilian case because the PT sought to change 
Brazilian politics by proposing a different way of doing politics and governing (Keck, 1992; Hunter, 2010; 
Gómez Bruera, 2013).  
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There is one important caveat with respect to the Brazilian case, however: Concomitant to 
the evolution of the PT from an opposition party to a majoritarian political actor, the 
representativeness of the voter sample used to measure congruence increases. The 
Latinobarómetro 1995 was representative only of 33% of the population, which typically 
means that the non-urban and poorer population living in Favelas is not adequately 
represented. In 2002, the sample is nationally representative. In other words, the superior 
quality of representation in 1997 might be due not only to the more homogeneous electorate 
that the PT had in its earlier years, but also to the fact that the measurement is based 
predominantly on those voters who are more likely to cast their vote on programmatic 
grounds. To gauge whether stronger programmatic linkages persist in 2002 for the more 
educated and politically knowledgeable parts of the electorate, I have restricted the sample by 
excluding voters with low levels of education and who are unable to give correct answers to 
questions tapping political information, but the results in terms of responsiveness remain 
unaltered (these results are available upon request). Whatever the effect of the biased sample 
in 1997, we can safely say that responsiveness in 2002 is very low or even inexistent in terms 
of the state-market divide, and modest with regard to the regime or clientelism and corruption 
issues.  
Finally, while the regime divide was more salient than the economic cleavage in the mid-
1990s in Chile, the situation has reversed by 2006. Figure 5 shows that the regime divide has 
become less polarized over time, but it continues to foster high levels of responsiveness. 
Representation along the state-market dimension improves strongly, on the other hand. This 
suggests that processes of realignment have taken place because voters came to base their 
vote choice more strongly on economic policy than the memory of the military dictatorship. 
In comparative terms, the Chilean party system was more responsive than any other one 
except that of Bolivia in the 2000s (Figure 2). At no point in time, then, did the party system 
thus offer favorable opportunities for populists. Surely, political discontent has been 
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widespread in certain sectors of society recently, and Chile also stands out for having many 
survey respondents who profess no party preference (see also Carlin, 2006). But this 
discontent has so far found a grass-roots bottom-up expression rather than a top-down 
populist one (Donoso, 2013; Roberts, 2017a, 2017b). Furthermore, there is evidence that the 
current left-wing government is responding to the demands from below to dismantle some of 
the economic legacies of the Pinochet regime (e.g., Roberts, 2017b). Future analyses should 
expand the analysis into the more recent past to gauge the further evolution of responsiveness, 
given that certain authors are rather critical of representation in Chile (e.g., Bargsted and 
Somma, 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has brought to the fore at least three important findings that shed light on 
commonalities and differences between left-wing parties during Latin America’s “left turn”. 
First of all, the emergence of new political actors occurs only where party systems are 
unresponsive to voter preferences. Where strong programmatic linkages between parties and 
their supporters exist, such as in Chile, evolving voter preferences are more likely to result in 
adaptations of the established parties to social change than in the emergence of new parties. 
Likewise, the “left turn” brought a party to power in Brazil that had been founded two 
decades earlier, and had been a serious contender for power in presidential elections since 
1989.  
Second, where representation deficits existed prior to the “left turn”, they resulted in two 
distinct paths of the left to power. In Venezuela, Chávez and the MVR followed a 
“majoritarian” populist path, where populism’s “thin” ideology prevailed over the substantive 
ideology. Indeed, the analysis has shown that for all the left-wing rhetoric employed by 
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Chávez, the electorate rallied by the MVR is ideologically diverse. Consequently, the rise of 
the left did not improve substantive policy representation. In Bolivia, on the other hand, 
where Evo Morales’ rhetoric has likewise been described as populist, the left rallies an 
ideologically coherent electorate with state interventionist credentials (besides mobilizing an 
ethno-populist cleavage that I have not measured in this paper, see Madrid, 2008). This is, at 
heart, a programmatic path to power, which I have proposed to label as “segmented 
populism”: It appeals to “the people” at large, but only specific segments of the electorate 
follow. Consequently, this type of mobilization has the capacity to improve party system 
responsiveness.  
The difference between “segmented” and “majoritarian” populism thus has important 
implications for the idea that populism is both a threat, as well as a corrective to democracy 
(c.f., Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012): While some forms of populism indeed represent a corrective 
to failures of representation, others do not. The key difference between MAS in Bolivia and 
MVR in Venezuela is that the former has strong roots in society, making it represent specific 
social groups. The above result thus testifies to the importance of Levitsky and Roberts’ 
(2011a: 12-16) emphasis on dispersed vs. concentrated authority, which leads them to 
distinguish between a “populist” and a “movement left” within the group of new political 
movements that emerged in the “left turn” (a similar distinction is made by Panizza 2009). 
Clearly, then, the “contestatory” (Weyland, 2010) or “wrong left” (Castañeda, 2006) is a 
heterogeneous category. 
The third important finding – and a largely unanticipated one – is that a similar fissure 
exists between left-wing parties in Chile and Brazil, which most observers consider exponents 
of the moderate or “institutionalized partisan” left (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011a: 13). 
Whereas strong programmatic representation is evident in Chile, the PT’s path to majority 
party status in Presidential elections has resulted in a decline of party system responsiveness. 
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This is presumably a consequence of an enlargement of the PT’s electoral coalition as the PT 
evolved from an exceptionally disciplined and programmatically-driven party to a more 
“normal” Brazilian party (Hunter, 2010). Yet this finding contrasts with the increasingly 
programmatic behavior of parties in parliament (Hagopian, Gervasoni and Moraes, 2009). 
The results presented in this paper then point to unexpected similarities in the support 
coalition of the left in Brazil Venezuela, suggesting that non-populist parties can also dilute 
responsiveness if they adopt catch-all strategies. 
What, then, drives partisan alignments in Brazil, if not parties’ responsiveness to voters’ 
policy preferences? On the one hand, my results show that a divide over different “ways of 
doing politics” persists in Brazil, with those critical of clientelism and corruption leaning 
towards the PT, and those who are less critical of these phenomena supporting the traditional 
parties. On the other hand, it is important to acknowledge that the standard of programmatic 
responsiveness I adopt in this paper is high: Voters who support the PT because they “reward 
Lula” for the social policy benefits they received by the PT government (Hunter and Power, 
2007), but who do not share the PT legislators’ conviction that markets should be regulated 
by the state, do not contribute to party system responsiveness (in part because the data did not 
allow me to measure voter support for social policy expansion). This approach to assessing 
representation seems justified to me, however: Rather than programmatic responsiveness, 
rewarding the PT for having received social benefits is more a form of economic or 
pocketbook voting, as Zucco (2008) concurs.  
One might still argue that measuring the state-market dimension in terms of preferences 
over market regulation is unrealistic in a country where many voters lack clear understandings 
of economic policy (my results showed that many PT voters are rather critical of state 
intervention to regulate markets). Traditional cleavage politics, on the other hand, assumes 
that social location shapes collective political identities, which in turn translate into similar 
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substantial ideological worldviews. One of the most interesting findings of this paper is that 
not only the Chilean party system meets these high standards in terms of programmatic 
responsiveness, as we would have anticipated. But Bolivia’s parties do as well, albeit being 
situated in one of the least developed countries in South America. This suggests that political 
agency, and more specifically the mobilization strategies adopted by political parties, is more 
important than contextual characteristics in shaping party system responsiveness.  
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